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Abstract
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has been a recipient of international
humanitarian aid from international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) since
1995. In recent years, multilateral and unilateral sanctions in response to the DPRK’s nuclear programme have
created a new layer of difficulty for humanitarians looking to engage with the authoritarian state. This paper
explores how sanctions are affecting humanitarian work in practice, utilising interviews with practitioners. The
research first surveys documentation, particularly from IOs, to establish how humanitarians understand
contemporary need inside the country. Next, this paper examines the impacts of sanctions on aid efforts, with a
particular focus on multilateral United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and unilateral American
measures. Unpacking humanitarian challenges and potential ways to navigate the sanctions regime provides a
foundation for academics and humanitarian practitioners to better understand both the DPRK and possible
avenues for principled, effective aid.
Keywords: sanctions, North Korea, access, protracted crisis
Introduction
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or
North Korea) is well known in the media and amongst
policymakers in relation to its cult of personality
surrounding the Kim family, abuses of human rights,
and nuclear weapons programme. In recent years, the
DPRK’s relationship with the United States and the
Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) has seen both
flickers of engagement and periods of increased ani-
mosity. In 2017, US President Donald Trump was
threatening the DPRK with ‘fire and fury’, but less than
a year later met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
in Singapore. In 2019, Trump and Kim met again in
Hanoi, and with ROK President Moon Jae-in at the
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), but these summits and
meetings have not resulted in significant, concrete
changes to the situation on the Korean peninsula. Moon
met with Kim three times in 2018, resulting in increased
inter-Korean cooperation including in the areas of sport,
management of the DMZ, and transport. In 2019, Seoul
channelled US$10 million in funding for humanitarian
aid through UN bodies, including US$5.5 million to the
World Food Programme (WFP). However, the Moon–
Kim summits have not brought the resumption of
previous inter-Korean activities such as increased ability
for humanitarian aid from South Korean civil society.1
While much of the focus amongst academics, policy-
makers and the public alike has centred on the DPRK’s
nuclear programme, humanitarian and human rights
issues are of vital importance to the 25 million people
living inside the country. The regime’s controls on
information, movement and access to the outside world
hinder knowledge on the humanitarian situation for
average and/or vulnerable North Koreans, but data from
agencies working inside the country indicates that a
prolonged situation of food insecurity and inadequate
access to quality healthcare and hygiene facilities
persists.2
The international humanitarian system in the DPRK
includes non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
international organisations (IOs) and bilateral organisa-
tions. There is no known independent civil society in the
DPRK. Humanitarians work with various national and
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local bodies to deliver their programmes. Humanitarian
agencies began working in the country in the mid 1990s,
after an appeal for international aid due to famine. Levels
of aid engagement have fluctuated and the famine ended
nearly two decades ago, but humanitarian presence has
endured. Some agencies and NGOs have been in the
country for over twenty years. Others have ended their
projects due to funding, concerns over aid being able to
reach the most vulnerable and issues with monitoring
(Smith, 2002; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2014), as well as
expulsion by the DPRK authorities (Ojardias, 2013: 61–
2). South Korean NGOs require ROK government
approval for aid activities to the DPRK, which has
varied depending on the political climate. In recent years,
the international humanitarian system has been subject
to restrictions in the form of unilateral and United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions. As of 2017,
Americans must also apply for US government
permission for DPRK travel.
This paper goes beyond the policy of sanctions
exemptions and asks how sanctions are affecting
humanitarian work in practice. The following subsection
reviews the methodology used in the research. A
literature review rounds out the introduction. Next, the
paper gives an overview of the available data on
humanitarian need. The research then examines the
impacts of sanctions on aid efforts, drawing from
interviews with humanitarian practitioners and others
with in-depth knowledge of aid delivery in the DPRK.
There are four core areas of impact: the burden of
exemptions processes, changing relationships with sanc-
tioning and/or implementing governments, reluctance of
third parties to engage with humanitarians active in the
DPRK, and threats to long-standing relationships and
collaborations with North Korean counterparts. The
conclusion discusses the implications of this research
through both academic and practitioner lenses.
Methodology
Primary documents utilised in the study include UN and
NGO papers, reports and appeals, North Korean and
international media sources, and UNSC documents. It is
important to note that data gathered in and/or about the
DPRK can be incomplete, sporadic and/or lack trans-
parency. However, there is a significant pool of infor-
mation to draw upon, and as long as limitations and
potential biases of data are understood, primary data can
be a useful tool for analysis. Humanitarian data, which is
subject to the obstacles of working within a repressive
systemwhere information andmovement are controlled,
gives an understanding of how agencies operating in the
country quantify and define needs within the con-
strained environment.
Humanitarian documentation on the DPRK is not
without its challenges – access has been a perennial issue,
leading several NGOs to withdraw in the 1990s and
2000s. While restrictions remain and continue to be a
major challenge, some indicators suggest aspects of
access can and have improved. There are reports of
improvements in some areas of access starting from the
early 2000s (Smith, 2002: 11; UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2000: 1). The
UN Resident Coordinator, in 2019, stated that ‘we have
made great strides in improving access and monitoring
for humanitarian agencies in the DPRK through
continued, principled, and robust engagement with the
Government’ (ReliefWeb, 2019). UN agencies have
gained some access to markets (Food and Agriculture
Organization [FAO]/WFP, 2011), though this is not
consistent (FAO/WFP, 2019), and NGOs are able to
work directly with local institutions such as hospitals
(interview with Roald Føreland of Evangelisk
Orientmisjon, 2019). This is not to suggest that access
does not remain an issue and a constraint, nor that access
improvement has been a linear and steady process. The
DPRK government and the restrictions it imposes
continue to be major barriers to aid distribution.
Instead, this information is presented to acknowledge
the small opportunities that could result in greater
understanding of the situation in the DPRK.
Semi-structured interviews with participants that have
a range of experience working or attempting to work in
the sanctioned environment, or with intimate knowledge
of contemporary humanitarian work in the DPRK were
conducted from April to July 2019. Eight individuals
from eight different agencies were interviewed, as well as
a group interview with three staffers from the same
organisation. Public interviews and events, such as a June
2019 event at the Washington DC-based Cato Institute,
were also analysed for trends and understanding of
sanctions impact.
Previous scholarship has highlighted the need for
information on humanitarian situations to be available
to practitioners and decision-makers in digestible, con-
cise formats (Darcy et al., 2013). The authors also
produced a practitioner resource, tailored to an
intended audience of policymakers and humanitarian
workers.3
Literature Review
Sanctions have yet to achieve their stated goal of
denuclearisation.4 Studies have argued that while
sanctions have limited the DPRK’s economic growth
potential, they have not prohibited it (Kong, 2018) and
that state trading companies have increased their
procurement capacities under sanctions (Park and
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edged’ sword of sanctions that appears in academic
discourse. Other examples include the argument that the
international sanctions regime restricts the DPRK’s ability
to integrate into the world economy, but may also inhibit
domestic economic reform (Gray and Lee, 2017), and that
whileUS sanctions have restrictedDPRK economic growth,
it is to the detriment of the North Korean people and their
standard of living (Kim, 2014). Scholarship has also posited
that authoritarian regimes can pass the costs of coping with
sanctions impacts on to their people (Haggard and Noland,
2017: 6), which informs Pyongyang’s ability to endure
sanctions through repression for average citizens and
rewards for the elite (Peksen, 2016).
Past research has considered sanctions against the
DPRK from a number of perspectives, including political
economy (Frank, 2006; Haggard and Noland, 2010),
international trade (Noland, 2009), economic statecraft
(Haggard and Noland, 2017), US policy (Stanton et al.,
2017) and international relations (Habib, 2016). This
study does not aim to evaluate the effectiveness of the
sanctions in achieving their intended goals, nor does it
strive to analyse geopolitical factors that resulted in the
sanctions. Instead, this paper investigates the effect of
sanctions on humanitarian actors in their attempts to
respond to the humanitarian imperative and the need of
North Korean people.
While some research has suggested that the UNSC
1718 Sanctions Committee has taken adequate steps to
enable humanitarian aid (Do, 2018), other sources have
posited that sanctions are at best restricting aid and at
worst contributing to rising humanitarian need. Smith
(2019: 1) argues that ‘absent sanctions exemptions that
would allow for necessary oil-based inputs into the 2019
agricultural production cycle, the logical corollary is an
expanded food catastrophe, threatening lives and
livelihoods of millions of North Koreans in 2020’.
Cohen (2018) argues that the North Korean
government is the core obstacle for humanitarians in
the DPRK, not sanctions. It is the responsibility of the
DPRK government to provide for its people, and through
a combination of political choices and repressive control,
the DPRK has engineered a largely man-made (though
also environmentally impacted) situation of
humanitarian need. However, this does not absolve the
organised international community from the
humanitarian imperative to respond to suffering
wherever it is found, or from ensuring the sanctions
regime does not negatively impact aid. As the first point
of the Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct affirms:
‘The humanitarian imperative comes first …. As
members of the international community, we recognise
our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance
wherever it is needed’ (International Committee of the
Red Cross, 1994: 1).
Humanitarian Situation in the DPRK
The DPRK made its first large-scale appeal for inter-
national humanitarian aid in 1995. Prior to this, the
country was a habitual recipient of fraternal aid from the
Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe. North Korean
founder Kim Il Sung’s economy needed aid at first to
rebuild after the Korean War, and then to sustain itself.
While Kim Il Sung’s son and successor Kim Jong Il, and
grandson and current leader Kim Jong Un, each
developed their own attempts at building the DPRK’s
economy, significant issues have endured. The impor-
tance of fraternal socialist support was made devastat-
ingly clear when the Soviet Union collapsed, and China
began requiring hard currency for trade. This was further
compounded by issues with the planned economy and
natural disasters. Also known as the Arduous March,
famine killed an estimated 600,000 to 1 million North
Koreans between 1995 and 2000 (Goodkind and West,
2001). Humanitarian organisations have had a
continuous presence in the DPRK since 1995, with
over 230 groups working in the shared spaces for
collaboration where regime and humanitarian interests
overlap, e.g. boosting agricultural capacity (Zadeh-
Cummings, 2019).
Food security has continued to elude the DPRK. The
country has struggled to provide adequate nutrition,
healthcare, disaster prevention and recovery, and water,
sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities for its citizens.
The Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (ReliefWeb 2008:
21) defines an emergency as ‘a sudden and usually
unforeseen event that calls for immediate measures to
minimise its adverse consequences’. The long-term,
structural backdrop of the DPRK’s post-famine
humanitarian need is not compatible with
understandings of humanitarian emergencies. Instead,
there is a situation of protracted humanitarian need
underpinned not by armed conflict, as in some other
contexts, but by political choices.
The DPRK’s Humanitarian Country Team (HCT),
comprised of UN and other resident humanitarian
agencies, releases an annual ‘Needs and Priorities’
document. While the data and methodology behind
the figures in the document are subject to questions of
accuracy, the document provides insight into how the
humanitarian community working in the country
understand need. The latest version at the time of
submission, a provisional 2020 document, outlines the
sectoral needs (Table 1).
A major challenge in responding to humanitarian
need is dealing with the political and economic root
causes. Decades of choices made by the regime, such as
resistance to integration into the global economy and the




















Downloaded from manchesterhive.com at 10/05/2020 09:54:13AM
via free access
programme, underpin the DPRK’s inability to provide
for its population. The humanitarian community is
unable to offer solutions that directly address the
structural drivers of need. For example, documents and
statements from humanitarian agencies cite environ-
mental factors, such as mountainous terrain, a lack of
arable land and dry conditions, and insufficient agricul-
tural inputs and infrastructure as the key reasons for the
DPRK’s food shortages (FAO, 2019; Froberg, 2018;
WFP, 2018). However, these explanations do not
account for why the DPRK is unable to purchase
agricultural inputs itself or address the systemic core of
the problem.
Sanctions
Since the DPRK’s first nuclear test in 2006, the UNSC
has passed resolutions denouncing the North Korean
nuclear programme and sanctioning various aspects of
the economy. Though other UNSC resolutions
(UNSCRs) have components that relate to humanitari-
anism, such as UNSCR 2094 in 2013 that called on the
DPRK to respond to ‘humanitarian concerns of the
international community’ and stated that resolutions ‘are
not intended to have adverse humanitarian conse-
quences for the civilian population of the DPRK’, it
was UNSCR 2397 in 2017 that established humanitarian
exemptions.5 Unilateral sanctions, namely from the
United States, have also had a notable impact on the
humanitarian sector. US organisations may need to
navigate theOffice of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC, part
of the US Treasury) and Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS, part of US Department of Commerce) licenses, as
well as restrictions on travel. Since 2017, American citizens
must apply for one-time use special validation passports
(SVPs) to visit the DPRK.While other unilateral sanctions
exist, this paper primarily focuses its exploration of
unilateral sanctions on the United States for three
reasons. First, there are a notable number of American
NGOs working in the DPRK. Second, US restrictions are
unique in their inclusion of travel constraints. Third, US
secondary sanctions, which target entities and activities
outside of American jurisdiction, mean American
sanctions have impacts beyond US organisations.
The question this research seeks to answer is on how
sanctions impact humanitarian efforts. It is not focused
on the direct humanitarian impact of sanctions on the
North Korean people. A report published by advocacy
campaign Korea Peace Now (2019) estimates that 3,968
preventable North Korean deaths occurred due to
sanctions delays and lack of funding. The figure is
derived from analysis of proposed UN agency
programming that could not go forward due to delays
and funding, but rests on several assumptions including
on agency capacity and, though not made explicit in the
report, on death rates being comparable to other
countries (see calculations in Kim and Park, 2019a,
2019b). This figure thus provides a ballpark estimate
from one perspective, but methodological challenges and
the root causes of need make it difficult to accurately
explore and capture the impact of sanctions on
humanitarian need on the ground. Hence, this paper
instead turns its attention to the organisations

















Table 1 Summary of the HCT’s ‘Needs and Priorities’, 2020
Sector People in need
People targeted
by HCT Sector objectives
Food security
and agriculture
10.1 million 1.3 million 1. ‘Increase availability of food and improve nutrition for the population by
increasing the production of staples and other food products using sustainable
production practices.’
2. ‘Increase resilience of vulnerable communities, farmers and cooperative farms to
the impacts of recurrent natural disasters and climate change.’
Nutrition 10.4 million 2.0 million 1. ‘Support equitable access to quality preventive and curative nutrition services
among under-five children and women of childbearing age.’
2. ‘Support equitable access to nutritious, safe and sufficient food and
micronutrients for vulnerable groups: under-seven children, pregnant women,




8.4 million 307,000 1. ‘Improve equitable access to at least basic and safely managed drinking water
and sanitation services.’
2. ‘Raise awareness on public health risks related to water, sanitation and hygiene
and promote adequate and equitable hygiene practices at households, education
institutions and health facilities paying special attention to the needs of women
and girls and those in vulnerable situations.’
3. ‘Strengthen health emergency preparedness and response capacity.’
Health 8.7 million 5.5 million 1. ‘Contribute to sustained and equitable universal health coverage with emphasis
on essential health services.’
2. ‘Support enhanced quality health services to diagnose and treat communicable
and non-communicable diseases, maternal and childhood diseases and services.’
Source: Humanitarian Country Team (2020: 4–5).
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This section outlines the impact sanctions have had on
humanitarian work through four lenses: (i) the exemp-
tions process, (ii) dealings with third parties, (iii)
interactions with sanctioning and/or implementing
governments, and (iv) opportunities for humanitarian
collaboration with North Korean counterparts. The
exemptions process covers aspects of actually applying
for sanctions or, in the case of US citizens, travel
exemption. Dealings with third parties considers busi-
ness with entities like banks and suppliers. Interactions
with sanctioning and/or implementing governments
covers relationships and exchanges involving humani-
tarian organisations and government entities outside the
DPRK. Opportunities for humanitarian collaboration
with North Korean counterparts looks at how sanctions
have impacted humanitarians’ actual and perceived
capacity to work with their North Korean interlocutors.
Information is drawn from interviews, and where noted,
public sources.
Exemptions Process
Three major areas for exemptions processes came up in
interviews: UNSC sanctions, US sanctions and US travel
ban. Some non-American groups also discussed restric-
tions from their countries of origin. Specific difficulties
for the different types of exemptions came up, but an
overarching theme of increased resources emerged.
These include financial resources, human resources
and time.
Prior to 2017, American NGOs operated under a
General License from the Treasury Department. Under
this system, humanitarians did not need to apply for
permission if their activities fell within stipulated guide-
lines. The guidelines have shrunk to cover strictly food
and medicine, and NGOs now need to go through the
Special License process which can require lawyers and
months of processing time (Daniel Jasper of American
Friends Service Committee [AFSC] in Cato, 2019).
Licenses are granted by OFAC. One area of confusion
is around OFAC’s use of the term ‘partnership’. The
OFAC website was updated in March 2018 to state:
‘Partnerships and partnership agreements between
NGOs and the Government of North Korea or other
blocked persons that are necessary for NGOs to provide
authorized services are not permitted without a specific
license from OFAC.’ However, as several interviewees
pointed out, the nature of the DPRK means all NGOs
must work with government bodies of some capacity.
There was also confusion surrounding UNSC applica-
tions, particularly when the sanctions were fairly new.
Organisations were unsure whether to list all the items
they wanted to bring to the DPRK or only sanctioned
items, with different groups taking different approaches
(anonymous interview, 2019). Areas of confusion related
to UNSC exemptions that came up in interviews
included the presence of instructions but a lack of clarity
around how things worked in practice, and difficult and
opaque bureaucracy. Not all interviewees agreed with
this, with one American interviewee finding the UN
process clearer than theUS process and containing better
feedback. American interviewees described different
tactics to the process, either choosing to go through the
OFAC process first and UNSC exemption second or vice
versa. Tracking the outcome of other organisations’
exemption processes emerged as a useful tool, with
interviewees explaining that they knew to apply for
exemptions for certain materials due to the experiences
of other humanitarian groups.
The administrative burden was a common theme in
interviews. Concerns ranged from time spent on appli-
cations and money for lawyers, to a lack of clarity in the
various processes. The ability of small organisations to
absorb the administrative duties of sanctions applica-
tions was a concern to several interviewees. One example
of an administrative hurdle came from an interviewee
who was applying for an exemption from her home
country of Australia. One of her Korean contacts named
on the application had a similar – though not identical –
name to that of an individual sanctioned by the UN. The
system flagged this, and the interviewee needed to prove
that her contact was not the person under sanctions. She
was able to do so by obtaining a passport scan from her
partner organisation, but explained that North Koreans
may not always be willing to give out such information.
Time was a major concern for interviewees and
humanitarians who have spoken about sanctions exemp-
tions – not only time spent on applications, but
unreliable processing times. Daniel Jasper explained that
AFSC would usually be willing to ship materials like
plastic sheeting very quickly to respond to report of
agricultural issues, but are now not able to do so (Cato,
2019). This demonstrates that even low-tech, simple
responses like providing plastic materials for agriculture
are subject to long waiting times, reducing humanitarian
ability to respond to need in a timely fashion. The UN
Country team reported 22 examples of delays to the UN
Panel of Experts (PoE) in January 2019, with some
activities being delayed by over nine months (UN PoE,
2019: 364–69).
One interviewee explained that long processing times
leave their organisation unable to be flexible and
challenges their ability to serve the North Korean people
because they need to plan about two and a half years in
advance. OFAC licenses can take over a year, according
to one interviewee whose license took nearly 250 days.
Processes compound –NGOs could need OFAC and BIS
licenses, UN exemptions and US travel permission. Ignis
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three years to receive all the necessary permissions for it
to resumemedical work in the DPRK (Korea Peace Now,
2019: 29).
Third Parties
US secondary sanctions, or sanctions targeting entities
and activities outside the jurisdiction of the sanctioning
body, have fostered an environment where banks have
very low levels of acceptable risk. This has translated into
difficulties with banking and financial transactions for
humanitarians, even when all activities are properly
exempted and wholly legal. As explained by Heidi Linton
of Christian Friends of Korea (CFK), ‘the banking
channel is largely closed down, so even while it’s legal,
it’s still impossible’ (Cato, 2019). Previous banking
options that were available to some humanitarians are
no longer viable – from 2016–17, UN agencies used a
Russian intermediary bank, Bank Sputnik, that was
cleared for transactions with the otherwise sanctioned
North Korean Foreign Trade Bank for their DPRKwork.
The channel collapsed in 2017 and no replacement has
been put in place.
The key banking issue raised by interviewees was
blocked transfers. Another theme was having to carry
large amounts of cash into the country, which has been
echoed in other sources (Rohrlich, 2018). The impact of
secondary sanctions was made clear in spring 2019,
when Finnish NGO Fida withdrew from the DPRK after
nearly twenty years of engagement in the agriculture and
health sectors. Fida’s announcement of the decision
named OFAC sanctions as one of the problems (UPI,
2019). While Fida is not an American group, the
secondary sanctions had extended to impact banks
outside the United States. One interviewee explained
that the risk tolerance threshold banks have drawn for
themselves is much higher than the actual legal
threshold. Suppliers have also been wary of working
with organisations engaged in the DPRK, as discussed
publicly (Fisler, 2018; Linton in Cato, 2019) and in the
interviews. An interviewee noted rising costs, as
suppliers may raise their fees due to the extra work
even exempted activity will bring them.
Sanctioning and/or Implementing
Governments
The range of items that humanitarians have reported to
be held up in customs is vast – nutritional sprinkles
(Jasper in Cato, 2019), nail clippers (Pennington, 2018)
and scalpels (anonymous interview, 2019). Even with
proper exemptions, humanitarians face challenges in
successfully clearing Chinese customs (anonymous
interview, 2019). One interviewee noted that the
Chinese border is in fact quite porous – if one is
willing to do things below the legal threshold. The
interviewee emphasised that their organisation was not
open to this and thus were stuck with the challenges of
navigating Chinese customs. Another interviewee
summarised that China holds a key role in determining
the degree to which sanctions are enforced in practice, so
Chinese decisions on implementation can have a major
impact on humanitarians.
Political influence on humanitarian exemptions has
been clearly demonstrated by the United States. In 2019,
the US administration decided to issue more SVPs and
the US mission to the UN started accepting more UNSC
exemptions after essentially putting a hold on them
before January 2019 (interview with Daniel Wertz of
National Committee on North Korea [NCNK], 2019).
The 1718 Sanctions Committee website posted two
exemptions notifications from October to December
2018. By contrast, ten exemptions were approved with a
start date in January 2019.
While advocacy aimed at changing North Korean
government behaviour or raising awareness of human
rights violations has been and remains largely a taboo
area for organisations with active involvement inside the
country, humanitarians have been targeting advocacy
efforts at their home governments. One interviewee
explained that she had previously had the attitude that
she was not engaged in any illicit activities, so why should
she have to work harder to prove that she was not doing
anything wrong. However, after seeing other groups
engage in advocacy towards their home governments in
regard to sanctions, the interviewee began opening
channels for communication with her home govern-
ment. She explained that advocating for herself and for
her work in the DPRK was now an approach she valued.
Other interviewees expressed positive outcomes of
advocacy from American NGOs, including the continu-
ation of SVPs (interview with Keith Luse of NCNK,
2019) and the US shift towards more sanctions exemp-
tions in January 2019 (anonymous interview, 2019).
Opportunities for Humanitarian Collaboration
with North Korean Counterparts
Sanctions have the capacity to impact a range of
humanitarian sectors, most obviously those requiring
parts and machinery. Water and sanitation are key
examples, with development of functioning wells facing
problems due to metal parts and water filters also being
difficult to bring into the country (anonymous inter-
views, 2019; Jasper in Cato, 2019). Health-related items
that have been delayed due to the sanctions exemptions
process include reproductive health kits, heaters for
immunisation clinics, ambulance parts, refrigerators,
wheelchairs, crutches, walking sticks and walkers,
glasses and hearing aids; food security programmes
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equipment that is time-sensitive due to food production
seasons postponed in exemptions (UN PoE, 2019: 364–
69). One interviewee expressed the view that projects
have become simpler and are undertaken in areas more
conducive to working under sanctions. There are other
reasons for using low-tech projects, i.e. concerns over
fungibility, difficulty of accessing replacement parts and
costs. However, interviewees reported challenges in
moving even items that are theoretically outside the
reach of sanctions, like medicines, and simple items, like
seeds. Long-term knowledge transfer projects, where
North Koreans live abroad for an extended period of
time and receive a stipend or salary during their training,
have become complicated due to restrictions on overseas
workers (anonymous interview, 2019).
Sanctions and other constraints appear to be nega-
tively impacting humanitarian ability to gain access and
conduct monitoring activities – two aspects of aid work
that have been a focus of humanitarians and those
against providing assistance to the DPRK alike. One
interviewee explained that NGOs have increased oppor-
tunities for access, but are unable to harness these
opportunities due to challenges of sanctions and securing
funding (interview with Esther Im of NCNK, 2019).
Funding has an impact on access and monitoring in that
humanitarians need adequate resources to expand their
programmes, as well as to justify requests to the DPRK
authorities for access to new areas. However, humani-
tarian funding for the DPRK has struggled – annual
appeals from the HCT 2015 and 2019 averaged to
achieve only 27.3% of requested funding. This is not a
direct result of sanctions, which for example do not
prohibit donor states from contributing to humanitarian
appeals for the DPRK, but one that compounds the
numerous barriers to aid delivery.
The more direct impact of sanctions on access and
monitoring can be understood in two ways: through
relationships and through physical ability for aid and
people to reach theDPRK. First, trust is a key component
to successful aid projects in the DPRK, but the sanctions
environment threatens to erode trust and increased
potential for access by restricting activities and in the
case of Americans, travel. One interviewee worried that
while NGOs were trying to counter the enemy image of
Americans cultivated by the DPRK, the sanctions were
reinforcing it. Second, multiple interviewees spoke about
monitoring – one mentioned that they were planning a
monitoring trip, but this was dependent on exemptions
coming through in time because otherwise there would
be nothing to monitor. Another had been in the situation
where the United States approved shipments, but denied
SVP requests. This meant the monitoring team was not
able to travel. The organisation was able to send non-
Americans instead of the US citizen staff that typically
went on monitoring trips that may have had more
suitable expertise to conduct the monitoring trip.
Several interviewees explained that other organisa-
tions are interested in engaging in DPRK work, but the
sanctions deter them from doing so. While obstacles are
significant, humanitarians have persisted. In 2019,
thirty-eight UNSC humanitarian exemptions were
granted to fourteen NGOs, three UN agencies, the IFRC
and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation, and two Italian entities.
Conclusion
Amongst the backdrop of nuclear tests and political
fluctuations, humanitarians are facing greater challenges
in responding to needs – and perhaps in learning about
unknown needs – due to sanctions. Sanctions, with a
focus in this paper on those from theUNSC and from the
United States, have exemptions to allow humanitarian
work to continue. Yet aid organisations still face
obstacles to delivering timely and effective aid. Inter-
views and publicly available statements from humani-
tarians revealed four key areas of impact. First, the
exemptions process itself brings a resource burden,
including time, money and human resources. Second,
third parties, namely banks and suppliers, have a low risk
threshold and will often choose not to work with
organisations engaged in the DPRK even in exempted,
legal situations. Third, advocacy aimed at implementing
and sanctioning governments is seen as a potential
avenue for progress. Fourth, the sanctions may roll back
progress from years of trust building and relationships
with North Korean counterparts, and also discourage
organisations from working in the DPRK.
While humanitarian exemptions are present in sanc-
tions legislation and many organisations are finding
ways to continue their work, it is clear that building
sustainable and effective programmes to respond to
humanitarian need is being challenged by bureaucratic
processes. Humanitarian response in the DPRK faced a
number of obstacles before the sanctions, most notably
restrictions put in place by the North Korean govern-
ment but also in securing adequate funding. Sanctions in
their current form add an additional layer of challenge to
an already strenuous context. A clear understanding of
the nature of humanitarian work, including the cross-
cutting impact of sectors and the need for holistic
responses, is needed for all stakeholders to ensure that
legitimate humanitarian efforts are not hampered. For
example, tackling tuberculosis goes beyond shipping
medicine – adequate water and sanitation, proper
nutrition, pharmaceuticals and medical care are all
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Tackling risk perception amongst banks and suppliers
is difficult, as private companies do not have incentive to
increase their resource burden to better understand
humanitarian exemptions. The compound nature of
exemptions – for example, an American NGOmay need
OFAC, BIS, UN and SVP permissions – challenges the
ability of humanitarian aid to be responsive, agile and
timely. As long as the sanctions regime is in place,
sanctioning governments and bodies must consider the
realities of the processes and their impact on humani-
tarian aid for the North Korean people.
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Notes
1 South Korean sanctions, known as the May 24 measures,
have prohibited organisations from delivering inter-Korean
humanitarian aid without Seoul’s approval since 2010. In
2018, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha
raised the possibility of revisiting the measures. The Foreign
Ministry later clarified that there was no government-wide
review of the measures, and they continue to remain in place.
2 An example, though by no means the only source, of such
data is the DPRK Humanitarian Country Team’s annual
‘Needs and Priorities’ document.
3 See Zadeh-Cummings and Harris (2020).
4 The DPRK, the United States and other major players do
not share a consensus on the meaning of denuclearisation,
leaving varying interpretations of the word. What is clear
is that substantive nuclear talks have not restarted, never
mind meaningfully progressed, at the time of submission.
5 [The Security Council] ‘decides that the Committee may,
on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the
measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee
determines that such an exemption is necessary to
facilitate the work of such organisations in the DPRK or
for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of
these resolutions’ (para. 25, emphasis in original).
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